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* * * * *
PROCEEDINGS
PROFESSOR RASKIN: This is an extraordinarily distinguished and
capable panel we’ve assembled. Each person is going to give you an
overview of his or her perspective on the topic of genetic profiling
and discrimination. Then I’ll ask a few questions and then we will
open it up to general discussion. Lon Berk is a partner at Shaw
Pittman; Betsy Sandza is a partner at LeBoeuf, Lamb; Michael Werner
is the Director of the Federal Government Relations and Bioethics
Council at the Biotech Industry Organization; Professor Susan Carle
teaches employment law here at WCL; Paul Steven Miller is a
Commissioner at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission;
and Nancy Segal is the Legal Director of the Program on Gender,
Work and Family.
The first couple of speakers are going to start by focusing on
insurance and genetic discrimination and then we’re going to phase
into the employment law issues.
MR. BERK: Thanks. I want to thank everybody for inviting me to
speak here. This is the first time I’ve been in a law school classroom
in sixteen years, and when I was previously in a law school classroom I
was always in that back row there, so this is a unique experience for
me.
I want to suggest this afternoon that the debate over genetic
privacy and genetic discrimination is a misplaced debate and that
those concepts should not be employed - that they actually do us a
disservice. I will not suggest that there should be genetic profiling or
that DNA should be involuntarily taken from people. My concern is
with the notion of genetic privacy: the idea that a person has a right
to deny access to information about the person’s genetic
1
constitution.

1. The notion of privacy with which I am concerned is a notion that applies to
information. This should not be confused with a notion of privacy that protects the
person’s body. In particular, there is a distinction between a notion of privacy under
which a person has a right to refuse to undergo a genetic test and a notion of privacy
under which a person has the right to prevent access to information about the results
of a genetic test. It is the latter notion to which my argument is principally
addressed. Although often conflated with the former notion, the latter notion is
often argued for in literature on genetic privacy. See, e.g., M.Z Makdisi, Genetic
Privacy: New Intrusion A New Tort?, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 965, 987 (2001)
(“Recognizing that one has the right to control what personal information is to be
shared or to remain private appears to protect an inalienable human attribute
associated with voluntary intimacy more than a severable property interest. . . . Some
consider this foundation of human dignity an essential human value which
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I am going to construct my argument in the context of the
relationship between insurers and insureds. I’m doing that because
that’s my background and what my experience over these past sixteen
years has involved. But I suspect that the same considerations may
apply in other areas, in particular in connection with the relationship
between employers and employees.
Let us start with the proposition that an insurer or an insurance
company is a social construction—some sort of social device—that we
have all decided to use in order to spread risks. We have, in other
words, decided to spread risks by entering into mutual promises with
insurers. Roughly the insurers promise that they are going to provide
coverage for a described set of risks, and the insureds promise that
they are going to pay the described premium.
The result is, in theory, through these mutual promises insureds
are able to eliminate their risks of catastrophic loss and insurers are
able to spread the cost of such risks equally throughout the
population of policyholders. If the market mechanism works, that is
exactly what will occur. If the market mechanism works, the
premium amount should reflect the total risk assumed by the insurer
and include some small further amount to reflect a compensation for
the services that the insurer provides, sometimes called profit, which
is ultimately distributed to the insurers’ vendors, employees,
shareholders, and in the case of some insurance companies—what
are called mutual insurance companies—their policyholders.
That is the picture or theory of the way the mechanism of
insurance is supposed to spread risk. I submit that given this picture
or theory, the mechanism will only work if the promises that are
made between the insurer and the insured are appropriate promises;
that is, if the premium is right and the promised coverage is right in
the sense that the one appropriately matches the other.
Now, these points may be elementary and obvious. I make them
because the idea of genetic privacy in their context does not fit. By
“genetic privacy” I mean the ability of one person to protect from
disclosure to another information that that first person has about his
or her own genetic constitution. If we introduce that notion of
genetic privacy into the picture of the insurer/insured relationship,
we undermine the ability of that relationship to spread risk.
If we introduce the notion of “genetic privacy” into the
insurer/insured relationship, the result will be that the risks that the

recognizes each person as a separate individual and forms the basis of the right to be
let alone.”).
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insurer covers have not been presented to the insurer with the result
that the risk the insurer promises to assume from the policyholder is
not appropriately tied to the premium the policyholder promises to
pay. This can be seen by a very simple example, which fortunately is
totally fictional. I want you to imagine that I obtain a review of my
genetic constitution and that I find that I have the genetic variation
that leads to Huntington disease. I understand that, if you have this
genetic variation, there is nothing that you can do to prevent
Huntington disease; and the only way you can get Huntington disease
is if you have this genetic variation.
I now know to a certainty that unless I die of something else I am
going to die after fifteen years of progressive physical and mental
deterioration. And so what do I do? Like any rational person, I
immediately go out and purchase the Cadillac version of health,
home care, and nursing insurance so that no matter what happens I
get the longest term and best health and nursing care. I pay whatever
is asked, and I now know that no matter what happens I am going to
be taken care of when this unfortunate event strikes.
Now, imagine that you have gone through the same test and you’re
a bit more fortunate than I am. You have found out that your genetic
constitution is such that unless you are hit by a car you are going to
die asleep at the age of 99 and 6 months.
Now, what are you going to do? Well, you are immediately going to
sell every kind of insurance that you have that provides long-term
care and long-term disability. You will not buy life insurance, that’s
for sure, and you are not going to have long-term care insurance
either. At least, if you do it’s only going to be a very modest kind.
What we have done, you and I, by pursuing our own rational
interests, is, in effect, upset the insurance mechanism that we have
determined to use in our society to spread risk. We have done this by
hiding information about ourselves from the insurers. If we adopt a
rule in our society enforcing the notion of “genetic privacy,” our
actions will be perfectly acceptable. There will be no right of insurers
to request or insist upon disclosure of information regarding a
person’s genetic constitution, since genetic privacy permits a person
to prevent the disclosure of that information to other persons,
including insurers. The notion of genetic privacy, therefore, appears
contrary to the theoretical underpinnings of the insurance
mechanism that we have chosen to use to spread risk in our society.
Now, why did I say at the outset that the debate about whether
there should be genetic privacy is a displaced debate? I think that we
generally have the moral and ethical intuition that, given that we use
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insurance to finance our health care, I should be permitted—even
with my knowledge that I have the genetic variation leading to
Huntington disease—to acquire the Cadillac version of insurance.
Since we have this belief, there is a tendency to conclude that I
should be able to protect the information that I have this genetic
variation against disclosure to third parties, including potential
insurers. But this conclusion in the context of that original insuring
relationship that I described at the beginning appears incorrect. By
refusing to disclose clearly relevant information about my genetic
constitution to my insurer, I am undermining the insurance
mechanism through which risk is spread. In a sense, I am like
somebody who says, “I’m going to burn down my warehouse in three
days, so I should acquire property insurance to cover it.” Or, take a
home owner, for instance, who has his house on the flood plains, sees
that the rising flood waters are coming and says, “You know, I’d
2
better get flood insurance.” What I am doing is similar. I am
refusing to disclose material information that is motivating my
decision to acquire insurance, just as the homeowner who sees the
floods rising is.
The intuition, I think, that leads us to say that I should be able to
acquire insurance without disclosing material information about my
genetic constitution derives from an intuition about entitlement, not
from an intuition about a right to privacy. I think we all generally
have the intuition that if I have this debilitating disease I should be
entitled to some sort of care. There should be some caring
mechanism in society that will provide such service to me. We use
this intuition about entitlement to conclude that I should have a right
to prevent from disclosure to potential insurers information about my
genetic constitution. The hope is that by preventing disclosure of
this information, I will be able to use the insurance mechanism to
obtain the care to which most of us believe I am entitled.

2. In general, losses are insurable only if they are fortuitous. As one treatise has
explained, insurance is “predicated on the general proposition that coverage is
provided for fortuitous losses and not for intended consequences.” ROBERT E.
KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 5.4(a), at 497-98 (1988). Many courts
have applied this principle in practice. See, e.g., Univ. of Cincinnati v. Arkwright Mut.
Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 1277, 1280 (6th Cir. 1995) (policyholder must show that the loss was
the result of a fortuitous event); Intermetal Mexicana, S.A. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 866
F.2d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Every ‘all-risk’ contract of insurance contains an
unnamed exclusion—the loss must be fortuitous in nature”); Fidelity & Guar. Ins.
Underwriters, Inc. v. Allied Realty Co., Ltd., 384 S.E.2d 613, 615 (Va. 1989)
(insurance “covers only risks and, as such, affords no coverage for a loss that is certain
to occur”). By preventing the disclosure of information about my genetic
constitution, I am, arguably, obtaining insurance for something that, according to
these principles, should be uninsurable.
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Most western democracies deal with the situation directly in terms
of an entitlement to care rather than in terms of a right to genetic
privacy. It appears that the debate about genetic privacy is, therefore,
a displaced debate. It should be a debate about the entitlement to
care, not a debate about the right to protect information from
disclosure.
MS. SANDZA: Good afternoon. I’m Elizabeth Sandza with
LeBoeuf, Lamb and I just want to follow up on a few points about
insurance having spent my years—and I won’t say how many—since
law school, pretty much practicing in the insurance field. Even
though when I was sitting out there I would have said, “No, not
possible.” It’s a fascinating world, really; it’s really a financial world.
And I have to say that discrimination does occur in the insurance
industry, in the insurance world, and Lon sort of alluded to some of
why it does, and I can tell you from first hand it occurs. This week I
got a bill from my auto carrier of a thousand dollars just because we
signed up our teenage child as a driver. So, in the context of
insurance, discrimination is not necessarily bad and equality is not
necessarily good. Think about the example of my teenage driver.
Auto insurers should be able to discriminate and I’ve enjoyed this
many years of not having to pay for that risk category of driver really.
That hasn’t been spread to me. Now it will be, but, God willing, in
two years she’ll pass out of that bubble and we’ll go back to normal
rates.
The law generally allows sex and age discrimination in insurance
3
and even requires it in some instances, but it generally forbids racial
4
and genetic discrimination—so far, anyway. And you can try to line
up these regulations and these laws and these cases on what
insurance discrimination is allowed and what isn’t, and I can’t make
sense of it. I’m quite sorry to say, that I think in large measure it has
come to where it is today because of social pressures in sort of a
patchwork of regulations and that all goes back to how and why and
where insurance is regulated.
Historically you should know, first of all, that insurance didn’t use
discrimination, and we’re talking 150 years ago they had what was


3. See 2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. 253 (West) (renewing the applicability of
§ 790.03(f) of the California Insurance Code, which requires “differentials based
upon the sex of the individual insured”).
4. See Jill Gaulding, Note, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance:
What’s Fair?, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1646, 1659 & n.86 (1995) [hereinafter Gaulding]
(listing states with laws forbidding racial discrimination by insurance companies); see
also Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y
225, 256-57 & n.236 (2000) [hereinafter Miller] (discussing state laws prohibiting
insurance companies from discriminating on the basis of genetic information).
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called assurance societies, and these were basically mutual life
companies, and this was a situation where we would all agree to
insure each other’s lives, putting in the same amount of money.
Well, because the population, some people were much older and
some were much younger, pretty soon the younger people said,
“What benefit am I getting?” and they left the societies and so the
society to cover those people dying off at the top had to raise their
rates. Middle-aged people started leaving the societies and the
societies collapsed. So, that’s why insurers went back to trying to
draw a balance between risk factors and pricing. And all of this
insurance discrimination has been challenged on several levels and I
thought maybe you could just hear a little background on that.
First of all, there were several challenges under the federal and
state Constitutions. Why doesn’t the 14th Amendment require equal
protection for people who buy insurance? Well, if you remember, to
be protected under the Constitution, you need a state action and
5
insurance companies are not state actors. And that was even argued
because they’re very heavily regulated by the states. What they can
and cannot do is pretty much dictated to them by the states. But the
courts rejected that theory. They said, “No, that’s not state action.”
Okay, what about federal statutes? Can federal statutes prohibit
insurance discrimination? So far they have not, and that is because
Congress has favored state-level regulation of insurance since 1945
6
when it passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act. So, therefore, if there’s
a federal statute, unless it specifically says it is our intention to also
regulate insurance, that federal regulation will not regulate
7
insurance. The insurer will be regulated in the state instead. There
is a slight departure of this federal statutory regulation under Title
8
VII —and this is a segue into the employment discrimination, and
there were two landmark cases—one called the City of Los Angeles v.
9
Manhart, and the other one was Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris,
where the Supreme Court said if the insurance benefit is provided by
employers, then the employer cannot violate Title VII and
10
discriminate. So, that’s sort of one chink in the armor of the state
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994).
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1994) (“No Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such
business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance”).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
9. City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 461 U.S. 951 (1983).
10. Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v.
Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (discussing applicability of Title VII to issues of
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regulated insurance system.
Okay now, what can the states do? Well, the states can do just about
anything. The states regulate insurance that’s written in their state.
They also regulate insurers located in their state. Okay, and we have,
like I said, a patchwork quilt of laws forbidding what they refer to as
unfair discrimination coming out of the states, and basically it’s very
mixed. But generally the states have passed laws forbidding race11
On sex, they’re mixed. In Montana, you
based classification.
cannot discriminate and provide better or worse rates, based on sex,
12
whereas in California you must. So, you don’t know what to expect.
With respect to genetic discrimination, there’s a certain logic to
allowing it because it certainly can be an indicator to a certain risk
that you either want to not cover, you don’t want to cover the person,
or you want a price for it. On the other hand, political pressures
being what they are, at least thirty states have already outlawed
13
classification based on genetic testing for health insurance. And as
you know, President Bush has recommended even federal legislation,
which would proclaim an intent to regulate insurance that would ban
14
genetic testing for health insurance. Well, guess what? The health
insurance agency is not all that excited. Why? Because ninety-five
percent of all health policies are group policies, and HIPAA already
prohibits group policies from excluding coverage based on even
family history and so, therefore, you can’t use genetic profiling for
15
group policies. So, it’s not a huge issue to the health industry, but
something to think about is all these other coverages where it might
make some sense.
What about life insurance? What about annuities? People who live
longer—should they pay a lower rate? What about disability
insurance? What about mortgage life insurance—something you
pretty much have to have? Should you have to pay more if you show

insurance discrimination in the workplace).
11. See Gaulding, supra note 4 (discussing state prohibitions on insurance
companies use of the insureds race as a factor in its decisions).
12. See id. at 1661 (discussing the variations in state law requirements and
prohibitions on insurance companies’ use of sex as a factor in its decision making).
13. See Miller, supra note 4, at 256-57 & n.236 (listing thirty-five states that
prohibit the use of genetic classification in insurance).
14. Adriel Bettelheim, Cures May Arise From Genome Mapping, But Congress
Anticipates Headaches, 2001 CONG. Q WKLY. 1505 (discussing George W. Bush’s July 23,
2001 radio address during which the president called on Congress to ban the use of
genetic information in the areas of employment and insurance).
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 1182(1) (1994) (setting out the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act which forbids insurance company use of medical history or
genetic information in determining an individual’s eligibility for participation in a
group plan).
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a genetic disposition for something? And what about nursing home
care? What about automobile policies? What if you have a genetic
disposition for alcoholism? Should your auto policy discriminate and
charge to you as it would to someone with a drunk driving
conviction? It will all be sorted out. It looks like most of it will be
sorted out in the states, and I submit it will probably sorted through
political pressures.
Thanks.
MR. WERNER: Good afternoon. My name is Michael Werner. I
represent the Biotechnology Industry Organization. The acronym is
BIO. We represent about a thousand biotech companies and
academic institutions. Now, most of you may have known that Dr.
Hudson and her colleagues at the NIH, as well as in private sector
companies, mapped the human genome recently. This was one
section of the genome that perhaps you hadn’t heard much about.
You can see, starting at the top right, looking at it, they found out the
gene for people’s reality-based TV fixation, willingness to drop $3.95
16
on a cup of coffee. So, the genome reveals more and more about
the human character.
Well, you know, we’re all here because of this challenge that we
face with genomic data. You’ve heard today, I’m sure, from lots of
the speakers about the vast potential we have to use genomic data to
improve human health, but of course all this information raises all of
these very difficult legal and ethical issues, and a lot of public anxiety.
Since the mapping of the genomes, the salience of this issue to the
public has clearly gone up and you’ll hear lots of folks who have
responded to public opinion surveys state that they have been victims
of some kind of genetic discrimination.
Speaking on behalf of our industry, we feel very strongly that we
need to address these issues. The technology, that’s used—genomic
technology—again, has vast potential to improve human health, but
if the public is afraid to use it, then all of this valuable knowledge will
be squandered. So, since about 1996, BIO has had a very stronglyheld policy that basically says that people’s genetic information
17
should be safeguarded against misuse. So, one of the issues we’ve
already heard about today is discrimination; what information should
be protected; what information does not require protection; what

16. Mr. Werner showed a cartoon depicting a deciphered DNA helical structure
which joked about the gene to buy expensive coffee.
17. See About BIO: Partner to a Dynamic Industry Coming of Age, available at
http://www.bio.org/aboutbio/history.htm (describing the mission of BIO, including
its policy stance on the ethical use of genetic information).
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information should insurers be able to use for underwriting; and
what information shouldn’t they have access to? We’ve also heard
that over the summer President Bush made an announcement that
caught a lot of people by surprise. He called for some kind of
legislative solution. In fact, there have been bills pending in
Congress for a number of years on this subject. But, since the
publishing of the genome and the mapping of the genome, this issue
has taken on new urgency.
So, what does the biotech industry think? Well, again, we believe
there should be legislation prohibiting discrimination, and providing
safeguards against the misuse of genetic information. By the way, we
would argue against the misuse of all personal medical information
of which genetic information is just one component. But that’s been
the industry’s view since 1996. On the other hand, we also think that
legislation prohibiting discrimination has to do three other things.
Legislation has to protect genomic data used in research.
Researchers use this information. They need to have access to it.
They need to be able to share it. That’s the way we’re going to figure
out all of these health problems. We’re going to figure out how to
design the drugs, the biological products that are going to cure these
diseases. We also need to make sure that when Congress drafts
legislation or agencies draft regulations, the definitions and the terms
they use are precise and up to date with technological developments.
And, finally, there shouldn’t be price controls. Our industry feels
very strongly in other contexts that the government shouldn’t
regulate the price of our products, and we feel that that’s appropriate
for other markets as well.
I don’t need to touch on this. You’ve already heard that HIPAA
18
deals with the group health market. Let me quickly touch on the
three main proposals that are in play now. The Slaughter/Daschle
Bill—also sponsored by Sen. Ted Kennedy—you can tell what it does
by its title: Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and
19
Employment Act. So it addresses discrimination in both the health
insurance and employment contexts. And basically what they’re
trying to do is something that is very difficult legislatively. And you
guys are fledgling lawyers so you can sort of appreciate how tough
this is. They’re trying to prevent discrimination against asymptomatic

18. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1184 (1994) (setting out legislation to regulate group
health insurance plans).
19. S. 318, 107th Cong. (2001) (prohibiting a group health plan from denying
eligibility to a group on the basis of protected genetic information about an
individual in the group).
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individuals who may go get a test and find out they carry a genetic
trait for something that changes the statistical chances that they may,
in fact, get some kind of disease later. So, that’s the person they’re
trying to protect. They’re not talking about somebody’s current
health status. They’re talking about an asymptomatic person.
They’ve got about 260 co-sponsors, so obviously if you do the math,
20
more than enough to pass the House. And probably close to thirty
21
co-sponsors in the Senate. From our perspective, things are pretty
good with that bill, but there are no research protections.
Now, the big Republican bill is sponsored by two Republican
22
senators—Olympia Snowe and Bill Frist.
The title—Genetic
Information, Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act—tells you it
does not address employment. It is just in the health insurance
context. Again, it tries to expand on HIPAA, and addresses eligibility
and premium adjustments for health insurance.
It addresses
individual market, whereas HIPAA focuses on the group market.
From our perspective, again, its definitions are imprecise. The bill
could include tests that cover current health status—not just the
asymptomatic individual. Also, there are no research protections.
And as I said, it does not apply to employment.
Now, over the summer, Congress was working on a bill, which you
all have heard of because they’ve been working on it for about eight
23
and a half years. It’s called the Patients Bill of Rights. And it has
nothing to do with what we’re talking about today. It had nothing to
do with it until the very end of the debate when John Ensign, a
relatively obscure senator from Nevada, stood up and offered an
24
amendment banning genetic discrimination. This was a complete
surprise to Senators Olympia Snowe, Bill Frist, Ted Kennedy, Jim
Jeffords—all of who had been working on this issue for a number of
years. It basically tracks HIPAA and says that group plans and issuers

20. Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:h.r.00602
(listing
the
256
cosponsors of the parallel House of Representatives Bill, H.R. 602, preventing
discriminatory use of genetic information).
21. Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:s.00318 (listing the twenty-six
cosponsors of the Bill in the Senate).
22. See Genetic Information, Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 2001,
S. 382, 107th Cong. (2001) (setting out the provisions of the Republican sponsored
bill to prohibit genetic discrimination in insurance coverage).
23. There are many different versions of this Bill. See, e.g., Bipartisan Patient
Protection Act, S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001).
24. 147 Cong. Rec. S7123-25 (daily ed. June 28, 2001) (setting out the proposed
amendment to the Patient’s Bill of Rights to prevent the use of genetic information
for purposes of insurance plan enrollment and rates).
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cannot deny eligibility or adjust premiums. It doesn’t apply to
employment and doesn’t have research protections. But it is now
25
part of the Patients Bill of Rights. So, what will happen with all
these bills pending? Nothing. Now, in fairness to the supporters of
this legislation, including the industry, it’s because of September 11th
and the aftermath of this tragic event. There was a lot of momentum
but, frankly, as all of you who read the papers know, Congress is
doing nothing these days except responding to terrorism attacks,
anthrax and national security public health emergency-type issues.
However, I would expect that if and when these issues calm, then
next year the stage is set. You’ll have industry, you’ll have patient
groups, you may even have the White House all pushing for some
kind of legislative proposal, and I suspect, given that we’ve had a lot
of conversations with folks, that we’ll be able to iron out whatever
differences there are, and you might see some legislation next year.
Now, as was said by the previous speaker, for sure the insurance
industry will be at the table. They have always expressed resistance to
this, and we can expect that to happen again. So, it will be very
contentious, but I think the stage is really set for next year.
Thanks very much.
PROF. CARLE: I’d like to start by thanking the Law Review for
organizing this very important symposium, and also Nancy Segal, who
took the initiative to organize this panel and make it coherent. We
are very lucky that she has joined our community with her wealth of
employment law experience. Nancy has directed me to put this panel
discussion in the context of employment law in general, so that’s
what I’m planning to do here. I’m also going to try to be a bit
provocative because that’s what law professors like to do, and I want
us to do a thought exercise in which we think about genetic
discrimination in the workplace from maybe a different perspective
than you all might be doing now. But I want to start by saying I think
it’s clear that there are many ways that employers can abuse genetic
information, and if we look at the track record of the way that
employers have used very unreliable kinds of testing, such as
personality testing and lie detector testing before they were barred
26
from doing so by legislation, it seems, to me, clear that employers
are going to do things that are not rational and make employment
decisions based on very poor information. That’s one way that we

25. Id. (showing that the Ensign’s amendment was voted on and added to the
proposed Patients Bill of Rights).
26. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1994) (prohibiting certain employers from using
polygraph testing in some aspects of the employment process).
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can be concerned about employers using genetic information in the
employment context; if they use information that’s unreliable, that’s
a poor indicator of performance or even risk, or they misunderstand
the information and don’t bother to get it right. But there’s also
another way in which we can be concerned about how employers use
genetic information, and that is that they will use it in a way that’s
rational for the employer but that violates our public policy for one
reason or another, and that I think is what’s going on with the
concerns about health insurance discrimination. Mr. Berk was saying
that really it is rational to try to figure what your big risks are and
exclude them from coverage. Or, if you don’t want to exclude from
coverage, to tailor your premiums to the nature of your risk pool.
But because in the United States we rely on private employers to
provide health insurance for our citizens, we don’t want that to
happen because we’re going to end up with a big class of people who
can’t get health insurance. So, there’s an important way in which our
thinking about genetic discrimination and our understanding of
American public policy more generally intersect, and I think that’s an
area that is interesting to think about.
And I’m sure that Commissioner Miller and Nancy will talk a lot
about the really important work that the EEOC is doing around these
discrimination issues, especially as they relate to disability
discrimination and some important new cases, such as the Burlington
Industries case, where an employer was using genetic testing to try to
figure out which of its employees had a predisposition to carpal
tunnel syndrome, apparently so that the employer could make the
argument that for workers’ compensation purposes, it didn’t have to
pay claims for workers who had carpal tunnel syndrome because they
didn’t get it from workplace conditions, but got it because they had a
27
predisposition for it.
So, that’s an example of the way that
employers are likely to use and abuse genetic information.
But I want us to also think about this in another way, and I would
suggest that really when we talk about genetic discrimination, we are
not talking about a form of discrimination, but about a methodology
for obtaining information about employees. And if that’s true, I
think the real question is what information do we want to allow
employers to use in making decisions about which employees to hire,
fire, promote, demote, grant benefits or detriments to in the
workplace—and what information do we not want them to use.

27. Bhd. of Maint. of Way v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 2001 WL 788738
(N.D. Iowa 2001).
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Here’s an example—here’s my thought experiment. Imagine that
you had an employer who’s hiring for an engineering job and had
two applicants. Both had good records from two different schools.
One applicant went to a very fancy, expensive private school; the
other applicant went to a cheaper state school, not nearly as well
ranked. The employer doesn’t know which person is going to be
better as an engineer and so hires the person who went to the fancy
school. All right, we would all say, that’s fine. That’s using all the
information that’s available to decide who’s probably going to be
better at doing this job. But imagine—and I don’t think this is so far
fetched, though perhaps people who are more expert in this will give
me more information on this.
Imagine in the future it becomes possible to identify genetic
markers for spatial ability. And I do think that they are now working
on identifying the genes in which certain disorders exist, so it’s not so
unlikely that we will at some point be able to find genetic markers
that correspond to certain kinds of cognitive talents. So, imagine this
employer says, “Instead of just making the decision based on where
the person went to school, I’m going to do a genetic test and I’m
going to see which person has the marker for better spatial ability
and hire that person.”
Now, why is that any different from hiring on the basis of resume
information? Is it more accurate? If it is more accurate, why does it
still bother us? One of the reasons is that we think there’s a privacy
issue there—that is that the information being made available about
ourselves is not voluntary. But I’m not volunteering the fact that I’m
five-foot- six, that I have brown hair, that I’m over forty. You can tell
that by looking at me. So, what’s the difference between reading it
off DNA or reading it off my appearance as I stand here before you,
especially if for certain things you might get better information from
DNA than you would from the impressions that people make in a job
interview or on their resume or whatever? Here I’m not saying I
think genetic discrimination is okay, but I am saying that I think we
need to go underneath the methodology and re-examine what
criteria we think are appropriate for employers to use in employment
decisions, and we need to re-articulate what our policy reasons for
that are. Genetic testing and genetic discrimination issues raise other
really fascinating challenges to us in figuring out employment policy.
One of them—and I’m just going to raise this as a question that I
think the EEOC people will have excellent answers to—as I
understand it, one of the wonderful things the EEOC has done in
trying to curtail employers from using genetic information as a way of
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engaging in disability-related discrimination is to say that to the
extent that an employer is interested in certain genetic information,
we’re going to assume that that employer thinks that information is
relevant to a possible disability. So we’re going to define that under
the Americans with Disabilities Act as somebody perceived as
28
disabled. But if it turns out that there isn’t a clear sort of category
divide between disability and differential abilities and if genetic
testing can allow us to figure out some things about differential
abilities, what does that do to our concept of disability? There’s
maybe a limited set of socially recognized disabilities that we are
going to say you cannot discriminate on the basis of, but what about
all of the other kinds of distinctions employers might be able to make
using genetic information?
So, with that I will turn over the microphone to Commissioner
Miller.
MR. MILLER: I’m going to stay down here, stay with the people.
Thank you very much for inviting me to be a part of this esteemed
panel, and my thanks to Ashley and Lisa for their hard work in
organizing the program.
I am going to talk today about employment discrimination. One of
the disadvantages of speaking at the end of the panel is that
everybody, starting with Kathy Hudson, has already said everything
that I want to say. On the other hand, one of the advantages of going
last is that you have the opportunity to comment on what everybody
has said before you. With that in mind, let me just make a couple of
points about insurance that might be helpful for the overall
discussion.
I think that insurance companies have thrived very well before the
mapping of the human genome and that they figured out how to
make money by insuring people. However, I do have a problem with
the insurance industry selecting out people who have the wrong
genetic marker and, therefore, will not ever be able to qualify for
insurance. Creating a group of people that, through no fault of their
own, are uninsurable when the United States Congress, with the
support of the insurance industry has refused to pass nationalized
health insurance legislation concerns me.
Burning down a
warehouse that one owns is a crime. Having a genetic predisposition
for cancer is not.
Everybody has a genetic misspelling or a genetic predisposition for

28. 42 U.S.C. § 121102(2) (1994) (stating that an individual qualifies under the
ADA if the employee is “regarded as” having a disability).
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something. Sometimes, in these policy discussions, we assume that
the world can be divided into two different groups of people—those
with genetic predispositions to disease, and healthy people. But
genetic technology is going to reveal something different. Everybody
will have genetic markers for some condition or other. There are no
“genetically healthy” people. For example, I may not have the
Huntington’s disease marker, but I may have a cancer genetic
marker. You may have the marker for Huntington’s disease, but not
cancer. So, everybody will have genetic predispositions for something
or other. This is important both in insurance and in employment
because there is no group of healthy people out there that will not be
affected by genetic markers. It is a mistake to separate things out in
any other way.
Secondly, the vast majority of genetic markers, and Huntington’s
disease may be the exception, only tells one that you have a
predisposition for the disease or medical condition. A particular
marker may indicate only a higher risk for disease. For example,
instead of having a ten percent risk of getting cancer, you would have
a forty percent risk of getting cancer. That is all that a genetic
marker indicates in most instances. A cop may not have the wrong
genetic marker, but if he eats a dozen Dunkin’ Donuts, smokes three
packs of cigarettes, eats a couple of Krispy Kremes, and then goes
home and belts down three scotches, well, he may have a high
likelihood of having a heart attack regardless of what genetic markers
he has.
Environmental factors are really, really important. It is critical that,
as we discuss the problem of genetic discrimination, that we do not
empower genetic information too much. Genetic markers are
important but they are not the end-all and be-all. There are lots of
environmental factors that come into play.
As the science of genetics explodes, and, as Kathy Hudson alluded
to and described in her talk, as genetic information and genetic
technology becomes more accessible and more affordable, the issue
that I grapple with is how society protects its workers from the misuse
of genetic information. My concern—and a concern that is shared,
as evidenced by anecdotal stories and empirical evidence—is that if
employers are allowed to consider genetic predisposition information
in making employment decisions, workers may be excluded from
employment opportunities for reasons that are wholly unrelated to
their ability to do the job. Genetic discrimination means, in this
context, an adverse employment action taken on the basis of an
asymptomatic genetic predisposition, not on the basis of having a
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disabling condition. I am not worried in this instance about people
who have diabetes or who have cancer, but about somebody who has
the marker that means an increased risk of having cancer. People
who already have a disability, a symptomatic genetic mutation so to
speak, are already covered under the law. In addition to worrying
about the job discrimination aspects of genetic information, a
potentially damaging by-product—one that I know that the biotech
industry and pharmaceutical companies are very concerned about—
is the fear of discrimination is going to make people reluctant to take
advantage of a growing array of tests or therapies that may identify
vulnerability to specific diseases. For example, somebody may not
want to enter into a research protocol or may not want to get tested
for something because of a fear of discrimination. I think that is
something to be concerned about.
The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination on the
29
basis of disability. The EEOC has stated that the ADA also covers
asymptomatic genetic predisposition discrimination. In other words,
somebody who is discriminated against on the job because of a
particular genetic marker is considered disabled for purposes of
30
standing under the ADA. To further expand on Professor Carle’s
earlier point, it is unlawful to base employment decisions upon one’s
genetic predisposition, upon a probability rather than based upon
one’s present ability to do the job. Indeed, the entire rubric of
31
32
employment civil rights laws, Title VII, the Age Discrimination Act,
33
the ADA —all are rooted in this same principle, that individuals in
the workplace should be treated based upon their ability to do the
job, and not based upon a fear or a myth or a stereotype about some
other kind of characteristic.
34
People have discussed President Clinton’s Executive Order. In
addition, we have heard talk—and we will hear more talk—about the
legislative bills that are floating around up on the Hill, and President
Bush’s endorsement of the concept. One thing I would like to add is

29. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment”).
30. See EEOC COMPL. MAN. (BNA) § 902.8(a) (interpreting the regarded as
prong of the definition of disability under the ADA as including those persons with a
genetic predisposition for a disability).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-200e-17 (1994).
32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
34. Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 C.F.R. 6877 (2000) (prohibiting federal
employers from discriminating on the basis of protected genetic information).
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that whatever bill gets passed up on the Hill, it will come to my
agency, the EEOC, to write the statute’s regulations.
Let me just say one last thing about the Burlington Northern case,
35
It is the first genetic
which was a case that got a lot of press.
employment discrimination case. The facts are important because it
moved the discussion—I think both in the mind of the general public
and the policymakers from one of science fiction to reality.
Burlington Northern Santa Fe is a big railroad. Somebody had the
bright idea, “Gee-whiz, a lot of our workers are coming down with
carpal tunnel, which means that we have to pay out money to those
workers.” Instead of trying to figure out why they were coming down
with carpal tunnel, they decided to engage in a surreptitious program
of testing employees for a marker that may be indicative of a
predisposition for carpal tunnel syndrome. It was then going to use
that as a reason for denying claims because, hey, they didn’t get
36
carpal tunnel from the workplace; they had a predisposition for it.
The EEOC filed a lawsuit against Burlington Northern. The case
was settled fairly quickly. The railroad agreed to halt the testing, and
not to retaliate against employees. Interestingly enough, they signed
on to advocate for the need for federal legislation to prohibit genetic
37
discrimination in the workplace.
Let me stop there because I want to get into the discussion. Thank
you.
MS. SEGAL: Well, I should have known better than to organize the
order so that I follow on Commissioner Miller’s coattails. But, anyway
as Professor Raskin said before, I’m currently legal director for the
Program on Gender, Work and the Family, which has nothing to do
with genetic discrimination—at least not yet—but this issue has
seemed to follow me around and I wanted to just make a quick plug
because our program is looking for a research assistant, so if
anybody’s interested please come talk to me after the session. I first
started working on the issue of genetic discrimination when I went to
work at the EEOC for an exceptionally brilliant person,
Commissioner Paul Miller, and started working on an inter-agency
work group that was assisting the Clinton White House in developing
an Executive Order on genetic discrimination. The inter-agency
work group included representatives from ten or twelve different

35. Burlington Northern, 2001 WL 788738.
36. See Discrimination: Burlington Northern-EEOC Pact Preserves Right to
Damages for Genetic Job Testing, 76 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A-1 (Apr. 19, 2001)
(discussing the background facts of the case).
37. See id. (reporting the terms of the out-of-court settlement between the unions
and Burlington Northern).
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federal agencies. The Keynote speaker here today at lunch, Kathy
Hudson, was very involved in the process. As anybody who’s been
involved in negotiations involving multiple parties can imagine,
negotiating this executive order with ten different federal agencies
was quite a project. I worked on it for two and a half years and I
believe that the project was underway for at least a year or two before
that, so it was quite a drawn out process.
After that I went on to work as labor counsel to Senator Kennedy,
and genetic discrimination was one of the issues that I was assigned to
work on. Senator Kennedy is a strong proponent of protections
against genetic discrimination in both insurance and employment.
He’s been a chief co-sponsor of Senator Daschle’s bill on genetic
discrimination. He also serves as chair of the Health, Education, and
Labor Pension Committee, so he has quite a bit of control over the
agenda of that committee.
What I wanted to focus on today, though, is what are the chances of
getting these types of federal protections passed—and, to focus on
the serious risks associated with leaving genetic information
unregulated. And I think the other point that’s been made that I just
want to emphasize is that genetic information should be protected
like race or sex since it has no impact on an individual’s ability to
perform his or her job. We have protections under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, which provide that employers are not allowed to
rely on medical information in making job decisions, or collect it or
disclose it unless they can show that it has relationship to that
38
individual’s ability to perform the job. So, it doesn’t really make
sense to not have that same protection for something like genetic
information where protection is even more warranted, because it
really has no relationship to someone’s ability to do the job. It’s only
a predictor. So, I think it just can’t be emphasized enough how
important it is to have these protections.
Now, I would say that before September 11th, if someone had
asked me what the prospects were of getting some genetic protections
in place, I would have said they were excellent. There was a great
deal of activity in the genetics area on the Hill, including numerous
briefings and hearings. In fact, there was actually a hearing
scheduled for this week. The President had issued his executive
order, which although a bit ambiguous in terms of its enforcement,

38. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994) (stating in regard to medical examinations and
inquiries by employers, “a covered entity may make preemployment inquiries into
the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions,” but otherwise may not
use any such medical information).
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explicitly stated the federal government’s position that there needed
to be greater protections in this area.
Senator Daschle’s bill, which Senator Kennedy co-sponsored, had
been introduced in the last two congresses and currently has 26 co39
40
sponsors in the Senate. Congresswoman Slaughter’s bill, which is
similar but no longer identical to Senator Daschle’s bill, has 255 co41
sponsors in the House. So, we were seeing a lot of congressional
support.
We were also hearing from employer groups that they wanted to
see some protections. Employers want some predictability in this
area. They don’t want this information. They don’t want to be sued
for having it or misusing it. And as one of the other speakers today
noted, even President Bush has come out in favor of protections
against misuse of genetic information in both insurance and
employment. Senator Kennedy’s staff was starting to work with
Senator Jefford’s staff to develop what we had hoped to be, at that
42
time, a bipartisan bill on genetic discrimination. So I really felt like
the stars were in alignment for something to pass. And then there
was September 11th. Everything changed, which couldn’t be more
apparent than this week when the House of Representatives closed
down with Congress operating at undisclosed locations, and Congress
for, obvious reasons, was required to shift its focus away from civil
rights and privacy issues to the issue of securing the nation. And it’s
unlikely, as others have noted, that any activity will occur this year.
However, like others on the panel, I’m hopeful that we’ll see some
activity in this area again next year. While some may claim that it’s
insensitive or even unpatriotic to continue to press for increased civil
rights protections at this time, I couldn’t disagree more. America is
based on these rights and protections.
So, on that note I will turn the spotlight back on Professor Raskin.
PROF. RASKIN: Thank you very much.
The issues raised here could not be more fascinating. I want to
offer some hostile questions to some people on the panel to get a
debate going. Commissioner Miller, I thought I’d start with you
because you were so eloquent and lucid, but I wonder if you really

39. Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, supra note 21 (listing the
twenty-six cosponsors of the Bill in the Senate).
40. H.R. 602, 107th Cong. (2001) (setting out the House of Representatives
version of a proposed anti-genetic discrimination law).
41. Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, supra note 20 (listing the 255
cosponsors of the House Bill).
42. See supra note 22 (discussing the Republican-sponsored version of a bill to
prevent insurance discrimination on the basis of genetic information).
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did give fair justice to the other side of the issue, and let me pose it to
you this way. Let’s separate, for the moment, insurance from
employment because I think that they actually present two different
kinds of cases. So, if I could ask you to talk about insurance for a
second, understanding that it’s not your field, but you ventured over
to that side of the table to talk about it.
MR. MILLER: That’s why I hated law school.
PROF. RASKIN: Why can’t the insurance industry take into
account individual genetic risk factors that are discernible by science,
even if they’re not a hundred percent certain—say they’re sixty
percent certain or forty percent certain. I’m sure they’ve got
actuarial experts who were able to do the math to incorporate those
levels of risk into particular premium costs that they’re going to ask
different people to pay. But say we know about a genetic risk factor
in a life insurance policy, for example, Huntington’s disease or breast
cancer or alcoholism. If that is actual information that exists, why
can’t it be incorporated?
And you say, “Well, there are
environmental factors”—of course there are, and they try to take
those into account just as well. In other words, they try to determine
is the person a smoker, is the person a drinker, and so on. But why
isn’t it perfectly consistent with the whole logic of insurance to take
into account all known risks? Or, are you trying to compensate for
the lack of universal national health insurance, or national life
insurance, or national auto insurance plan by preventing clearly
relevant kinds of information from being used by particular
companies?
MR. MILLER: Well, as Jamie may know, because we were in law
school together, I never took an insurance class in law school.
However, with that caveat, as we say in Washington, let me just say
this about that. My point is that we need to be very careful as we
engage in these discussions about genetic information that we do not
empower genetic markers with too much meaning, and that we
recognize exactly what such information may be telling us about an
individual, and what the information is not telling us about an
individual. As I said, I think that even in the context of Huntington’s
disease, where some would say that there is a one hundred percent
certainty that if you have the marker, you will develop Huntington’s
disease, it is still very unclear as to what the Huntington’s disease is
going to look like, how severe it is, when the onset is, and so on and
so forth. For the vast, vast majority of these markers, we are only
really talking about probabilities. Now, I know that there are many in
the insurance industry that are concerned about this notion of
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unequal knowledge. The mistake is when somebody goes out, finds
out that they have something or that they are about to get something,
and load up on their insurance without telling the insurance
company. I think that those problems can be addressed, that those
are problems that are floating out there and folks will figure out a way
to deal with that kind of information. But I think that it is wholly
problematic to exclude large groups of people from the insurance
marketplace because all you’re going to do is drive people away from
taking tests that ultimately can help them. To flip it back into the
employment context, for an employer to say, “Well, gee-whiz, I want
to cut my insurance costs and therefore make sure nobody gets sick
in my workplace, so I want to look through the medical information
and figure out who has the genes for cancer, BRCA 1, BRCA 2—
basically exclude the folks with cancer markers from my work place.”
But does that really get you anywhere? I mean, it doesn’t really get
you anywhere. You’re basically having the employer make arbitrary
decisions about what are going to be unacceptable diseases or
markers to have and, ultimately, what are going to be acceptable
markers to have because ultimately employers are going to have to
hire somebody. Therefore I am concerned, especially in the
employment context, but in other contexts also, that these genetic
markers are being used as a filter to exclude people from large pools.
PROF. RASKIN: Let me shift down to the other side of the table
there. It seems like the whole move toward using genetic testing as a
way to exclude people from insurance or employment cuts against a
very deeply ingrained aspect of American democratic ideology, which
is an anti-hereditary principle. We are a nation conceived in
insurgency against royalty and the idea that people pass political
leadership down through the blood. The Constitution bans taints of
blood, that is, people being made criminals by virtue of something
43
that their parents did or their grandparents did. And to what extent
is your side really trying to reconstruct some kind of genetic
hierarchy in this society by using information this way?
MR. MILLER: Genetic royalists.
MR. BERK: Genetic royalists, yes. Let me say I am not and I have
never been a monarchist. But the question, I think, really comes
down to a question of subsidies because the question really is, can
somebody require me to subsidize somebody who has a marker, an
unfortunate genetic marker? Assuming that I don’t have any

43. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“No Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted”).
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unfortunate genetic markers, and that question really amounts to, in
a sense, should not I be able to buy insurance that accurately reflects
the risks that I’m trying to avoid?
PROF. RASKIN: But doesn’t that cut against the whole idea of
insurance? I mean, once you enter an insurance pool, aren’t you by
definition going to be insuring people who get things that you don’t
get and vice versa? And if you could know your own risks, wouldn’t
everybody just self-insure?
MR. BERK: If you could know your own risks and you had enough
money, you still could not self-insure because the whole idea of
insurance is to spread risk, and the whole question is what risk do
you, as a policyholder, want to spread? Now, in most cases in
connection with health insurance, this is not a serious issue because
of federal legislation saying that if you leave a job, with any
preexistent conditions, you are still able to take your insurance with
you.
SPEAKER: [Question inaudible].
MR. BERK: Right, but the question for an individual who’s trying
to get insurance on their own is very real. What would happen, for
instance, for somebody with a “clean” genetic bill of health is that
they cannot get insurance for themselves without subsidizing
somebody who does not have a “clean” genetic bill of health whatever
that means. As Commissioner Miller said, if you actually look at the
science, really what you’re talking about is differences of probability
among different people of maybe ten percent here, thirty, forty
percent here. And so the question really becomes why shouldn’t that
kind of information be given to insurance companies so they can
more accurately balance different individuals’ risk classifications. I
think the jargon is “medical underwriting.” Insurance companies do,
to some extent, “medical underwriting.” They go to your house—if
you want to get a life insurance policy, you’ll find that they go to your
house and they take your blood pressure and the nurse practitioner
gives you a whole series of tests. If you want to buy life insurance you
have to say that you do not smoke or else you will be put in a different
category of risk.
In fact, in most states if you lie and say you don’t smoke and you
die within a year or some specified amount of time, your life
44
insurance policy is void. So why should you be able to refuse to
disclose information about your genetic constitution? The issue

44. See Gary Schuman, Misrepresentation of Smoking History in Life Insurance
Applications, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 103, 120-21 (1994) (listing states that allow rescission
of life insurance policies due to misrepresentation of the insured’s smoking history).
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proponents of genetic privacy have to answer is why should
subsidizations caused by these failures to disclose disturb the
workings of the market mechanism?
PROF. RASKIN: And I think the answer goes back to this point that
we have a belief in our society that we shouldn’t be drawing
distinctions between different groups of people based on factors that
they have no control over, even if they might be real factors in terms
of their physical or mental or psychological constitutions.
MS. SANDZA: I think the insurance industry is sort of a paper tiger
here and being used as a scapegoat because I really don’t think it’s as
big an issue for them as everybody else seems to think who’s a
noninsurer because, first, in the health insurance field it’s a very
small piece of the market because ninety-five percent is group; and,
secondly, as Lon just suggested, in the life insurance business after
45
you’ve had your policy for two years it doesn’t matter. It doesn’t
matter if you lied; it doesn’t matter if you’re dying; it doesn’t matter
what your genetic makeup was so that, therefore, if you were to be
tested at age twenty-five, that you were going to die at age seventy, it
doesn’t matter.
MR. MILLER: Well, that’s great. I mean, the insurance industry is
going to sign onto a genetic anti-discrimination bill for health
insurance and life insurance. That’s great.
MR. BERK: Genetic discrimination I think has to be distinguished
from genetic privacy. What I would object to is the notion of genetic
privacy. If everybody in society decides that they want the risk
classifications for health insurance to be in such and such a way, then
insurance companies would have to live with that. But the question
of genetic privacy is the idea that a potential policyholder can hide
material facts in order to obtain a lower risk classification than
everybody in society has decided they should be in.
PROF. RASKIN: Do you really mean by that insurance companies
should be allowed to require genetic testing as a condition for
purchase of a policy?
46
MR. BERK: They are allowed to do that in some jurisdictions.
PROF. RASKIN: Yes, but genetic privacy is sort of a red herring
there because if the insurance companies have the power and want
the information, they can say, “We’re not going to sell you a policy

45. See id. at 130 (noting that most states only allow a two year contestable period
for misrepresentations by the insured).
46. See Natalie E. Zindorf, Comment, Discrimination in the 21st Century: Protecting
the Privacy of Genetic Information in Employment and Insurance, 36 TULSA L.J. 703, 719-20
(2001) (noting that not all states prohibit the use of genetic information and that
some specifically allow submission of favorable genetic testing).
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until first you undergo this genetic test.”
MR. BERK: Not everywhere. In Texas, for instance, they cannot
47
And even the definition of “genetic
use genetic information.
information” is very hard to come up with because we engage in
genetic discriminations all the time. Unfortunately because of my
genetics I’m not going to break a major league home run title. But
somebody’s going to do that because of his genetics or her genetics
and get a huge sum of money for it.
PROF. RASKIN: But you wouldn’t be excluded from pro baseball
on the basis of a test, a genetic test.
MR. BERK: I am excluded on—well, what’s the difference?
MR. MILLER: You want to be excluded on the basis of your ability,
on the basis of your qualifications. I think that’s a red herring. To
say that “I’m never going to play NBA basketball because of genetics”
—well, I’m not going to play NBA basketball because I’m not
qualified to play NBA basketball. But, to the extent that I want to get
a job in some company and that company says, “Oh, no, you’ve got a
higher genetic risk for cancer and, therefore, we are going to exclude
you” even though I am well-credentialed and qualified for that
particular position, I think that that is very, very different. Again, the
notion is that everybody’s got something and so therefore,
particularly in the employment context, it is a false choice to say that
those who have no genetic risks or all of those who are genetically
perfect or genetically free of disease want to get together and insure
each other and exclude everybody that has genetic markers for
disease. Well, there’s not going to be anybody because you may not
have Huntington’s disease but you may have markers for all sorts of
other stuff. So do all the cancer genetic marker folks get together
and go to Aetna, and all the heart disease people go to another
insurance company?
PROF. RASKIN: Well, let’s take that question seriously. I mean,
you might say people who have a twenty percent chance of dying by
age fifty get together and have one insurance pool and they have
another group of people who have a forty percent chance, a group of
people with five percent, and presumably you would like to stack up
the population in that way so that people who are actuarially in
similar situations would be grouped together.
MR. BERK: I’m not saying that I’m a proponent of that.
PROF. RASKIN: I mean, that’s what the market would do, and it

47. See id. at note 155 (listing Texas among states with legislation prohibiting the
use of genetic testing in insurance).
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should be allowed to work that way, don’t you think?
MR. BERK: It remains a question whether you think the market
should be allowed to work in that way or not, but the theory behind
insurance I think—
PROF. RASKIN: Depends on whether you think there’s such a
thing as a market.
MR. BERK: Well, that’s another question. The theory behind
insurance is that yes, we should fix risk classifications and then let the
market work accordingly. By inserting a notion of genetic privacy in
the insurance context, you’re undermining that theory.
MS. SEGAL: I just wanted to say that there are thirty-four states that
48
now protect against genetic discrimination in the insurance context,
twenty-eight states that have protections against genetic
49
discrimination in employment, and I haven’t heard a flood of
complaints or problems resulting from the state legislation.
MR. BERK: Most of it is in the health insurance field I think, and
there, because you have the group plans, you’re not in a situation
where it becomes a major issue. And also I think, time may lead to
further issues. This whole question is in its infancy. Even though
we’ve mapped the genome we may not know what the map shows.
PROF. CARLE: It seems to me that the problem with health
insurance, even with group insurance, is that without legislative
prohibitions against this, employers would want to go to insurance
companies and say, “Look, we pre-screen everybody that we hire. You
tell us which genetic markers you think make us increase the cost of
insuring this risk pool and we’ll screen those people out and we’ll
offer you a workforce that doesn’t have those people in it and won’t
you give us a lower premium,” and the health insurance company
would say “Sure.”
PROF. RASKIN: But, Susan, doesn’t that go on all the time anyway
with other types of risk factors? Environmental risk factors—I mean,
take your example.
PROF. CARLE: Right, but that creates an incentive for employers
to rid their workplaces of environmental hazards that are likely to
produce higher health insurance costs.
PROF. RASKIN: Yes, but in an individual case it might not be
accurate. I mean, I’m surprised that everybody just accepts so
cavalierly the fact that insurance companies should be able to

48. See id. (listing the various states which regulate the use of genetic information
in insurance).
49. See id. at note 110 (listing the states that prohibit workplace discrimination
based on genetic information).
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discriminate against young men, young women in auto insurance
rates.
PROF. CARLE: Well, exactly. That’s another point that I have
about what you said. We do engage in all kinds of discrimination.
We use certain indicators as predictive, and they’re not predictive.
But it is possible that there may be certain genetic indicators that are
better predictors than things like age or gender. And I share the
intuition that there’s something wrong with reading DNA and then
making decisions on the basis of it, but I think we need to articulate
what that reason is beyond saying employers will use it irrationally
because I think we also want to say that when even employers are
using it rationally, if they’re picking something that’s a better
predictor—or a health insurance company is picking a better
predictor than age or gender or other things that health insurance
companies are often allowed to use—that there’s a reason why that
shouldn’t happen. We have to say, “What is the reason why even a
rational decision based on genetic information or information that’s
obtained from DNA strands and not from some other indicator—why
is that wrong?”
MS. SANDZA: I think that you raise a good point and maybe it’s
helping crystallize some sort of conclusion here, that most—not
including age—other categories that insurance companies use are
behavioral based as opposed to something inherent, such as drinking
or smoking. That’s one thing. And then I think another factor is
that this genetic testing is just so very, very personal. And then,
thirdly, the genetic testing is a predictor. It’s not a known event. So,
maybe that’s what offends us. I would have to join and share your
offense, but I can’t predict whether or not how the laws will go in the
states because, you know, we have a huge precedent for allowing
discrimination in insurance, and there’s even logic to it. But maybe
this one’s just over the edge.
MR. MILLER: But it is important to note that distinctions do not
always rise to the level of discrimination. Simply because you create
distinctions between groups does not mean that you are
discriminating.
PROF. RASKIN: Betsy.
MS. SANDZA: Yes, I just wanted to add two points. One is that one
of the differences between HIPAA and the federal bills that are being
proposed is that the federal bills add a prohibition against requiring
or requesting individuals to get a genetic test, a rule that HIPAA does
not have, and that’s something that people often point to as one of
the holes in the existing regulatory framework.
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And the second is just an observation. I think that the reason it
feels different is not only because it is behavioral, it’s that it’s all this
new technology. And it’s the use and the development in what seems
to be growing very, very quickly this development in application of
technology as opposed to—you know, people are used to the idea
that if you smoke it sounds like your premium should be more
because we all sort of know that smoking causes cancer, or we think
we do, whereas now it’s not only that this stuff is more precise—on
the one hand more precise but also on the other hand it just changes
the statistics; it does not prove anything. I think also because we as a
society have not figured out how to balance the possible benefits of
these technologies and the use of the technology to—for example,
you find out that your risk factor changes, so maybe you change your
lifestyle, maybe you change your diet, maybe you go see your doctor
more often then you would have otherwise. And yet all this
technology could also be used in a way that seems harmful, and I
think that’s why everybody is grappling with this and that’s why it
feels different—because it’s us trying to figure out, as a society, how
we cope with the development of new technology.
PROF. RASKIN: Yes.
MS. SEGAL: I just want to further respond to Betsy’s comment by
borrowing some examples that Kathy’s boss, Francis Collins, has used
when I’ve heard him speak. One problem is that if you screen people
on the basis of genetic information, which really goes against an
important principle in America that people should be judged based
on their abilities and their performance, you’d end up screening out
people like Lou Gherig from being a ballplayer, and I forget who the
composer was but, you know, famous . . .
MR. MILLER: Beethoven.
MS. SEGAL: Thank you—who was tone deaf and various others,
and it just goes against the grain of what we believe in America that
people should be based on their abilities, not on some prediction of
what might happen to them in the future.
PROF. CARLE: But their abilities are also highly genetically
influenced.
MS. SEGAL: But some people go beyond their genetic
predisposition.
PROF. RASKIN: Well, the geneticists would say that’s impossible,
that by definition, you’re just fulfilling some genetic predisposition or
capacity that you have.
MR. MILLER: But any dean of admissions would say that that’s
likely. People who get low LSAT scores or high LSAT scores go on to
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be either successful law students or successful lawyers or not. It is
predictive, but only to a certain extent. One would not want their
SAT score following them throughout their entire career. I wouldn’t
want mine to follow me around. I can only imagine that the
President is about to nominate me to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, and looks at my SAT scores and says, “Oh,
gee-whiz, but you only scored so-and-so on your SATs - you must not
be very well-qualified for the Commissioner,” and as a result, he
decides to withdraw my nomination. Predictors can only predict,
they do not determine.
PROF. RASKIN: The point I’m trying to make is that an SAT or
LSAT doesn’t determine what a person’s potential limits are in terms
of what they can do, but at least what the geneticists are saying is that
everything that you can accomplish—you might not accomplish it but
everything you can do is built into your genetic structure.
MR. MILLER:
No, that is absolutely wrong, and credible
geneticists are not saying that. There is a genetic component and
there is an environmental component, and today we do not
understand the relationship between the two.
Certainly not
everybody who has the BRCA gene, the breast cancer gene, for
example, is going to get breast cancer. Not everybody with, you
know—go down the list—is going to get that particular disease, and
people may get lung cancer irrespective of smoking or genes or
whatever. There are all sorts of factors that go into the mix, and I
think it is unfair, particularly in the employment context, to empower
this new piece of technology with such power that that’s all you’re
looking at and everything else becomes irrelevant or falls away. That
is why I think legislation . . .
PROF. RASKIN: Okay, let’s just go down the line. Nancy.
MS. SEGAL: I’d like to defer to Kathy Hudson since none of us are
geneticists, and I’ve heard Francis Collins say over and over again that
genes cannot control what a person is going to become, so Kathy, if
you would like to—I don’t want to put you on the spot, but you know
Francis’ words, and you know this field better than anyone in this
room, so . . .
DR. HUDSON: It’s certainly true what I am going to be able to
achieve. We are much, much more than the sum of our genetic
parts.
MR. WERNER: The other thing here is they’re also called policy
objectives, I think, and one public policy reason for making this
distinction, and perhaps if you want to even accept the argument that
it’s duplicative protection, is there may be value in giving people
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peace of mind, so they get the tests, they take advantage of the
technology because we think, as a society, there’s value for people to
find out more about their health status. So, on top of everything else,
there might be sort of a counter-public policy reason why we might
want to put those protections into law or regulation.
MR. BERK: I was going to say that there is a critical difference
between employment and insurance, in that in employment I think
the intuition is we want to judge people on the basis of their ability;
insurance is really all about prediction. It doesn’t matter what your
ability there is because we’re talking about what might happen and
what the probabilities are.
PROF. RASKIN: Right, so the relevant question in employment
decisions is, is the person able to do the job? And to succeed you
could say that the genetic information is of little or no value to
determine that. But, in the insurance context it might not be the
whole story, but it might be one key data that you would want to
include. Is that right?
MR. BERK: Yes.
PROF. RASKIN: Thank you.
MS. SEGAL: But if I could just say that there’s nobody here with
insurance knowledge on the employee side to rebut that, so just
because we’re being silent doesn’t mean that there aren’t some
reasons . . .
MR. BERK: Silence doesn’t mean assent.
MS. SEGAL: That’s right, to also have protections in insurance.
MR. BERK: So stipulated.
PROF. RASKIN: Let’s see, are there questions from our audience
here?
SPEAKER: My question is directed at the insurance side of the
table. Can you explain risk spreading?
MR. BERK: The law of large numbers suggests that the expected
risk should equalize if there is a large enough population. By
charging a premium that reflects that expected risk, an insurance
company is able to spread risk.
The idea is that everybody can avoid catastrophic risk by taking on
the average risk, and that will work if you have a large enough
population. That’s what I mean by risk spreading.
SPEAKER: [Question inaudible].
MR. BERK: That would work if everybody were required to buy
insurance. But in our economy and except in the employment
context—that’s not something that we’ve been willing to do. And so
you have the problem of adverse selection.
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PROF. RASKIN: Let me ask you about that because you mentioned
before the possibility that someone is going to object that they’re
forced into a pool with someone with a high genetic risk when they
don’t have it—they know they don’t have it. Are people actually
complaining about that? In other words, is that coming from
policyholders?
MR. BERK: I’ve read a couple of Law Review articles where people
complain about that, but I don’t think in the real world that that’s—
and that’s no criticism of these Law Review articles; they were very
interesting—but I don’t think that’s to say that in the real world that’s
happened yet, I think that’s because these issues are so new. But that
does not mean we should not struggle with the issues and try to figure
out how to address them.
DR. HUDSON: [Comment was inaudible].
PROF. RASKIN: Let me ask you about that. Do you mean as to the
purchase of future policies, or do you mean these people have an
obligation to tell the insurance company just so they’re aware of it,
but they’re not going to be uninsured—
DR. HUDSON: Well, in the individual insurance market, they
could be uninsured.
PROF. RASKIN: You mean they could?
DR. HUDSON: They could. So I’m at risk for developing X, Y, or
Z, and I know that and these statutes are passed so the insured
cannot know that. What is going to be the effect on the individual
health care industry and am I going to opt in early or to protect
myself, and the bottom line is that’s good news to the health
insurance companies, because the kinds of risks that we’re talking
about are risks of me at age forty developing X, Y, Z by the time I’m
seventy-five, and it’s definitely motivation for me to get insurance,
which it does, and that is good for you because you’re only going to
insure me for three years. The average stick with one insurance plan
is three years. So, in effect it’s good for the insurance—very limited
data on that, the genetics. They are doing some studies on the
findings, but there are no data to suggest that people alter their
insurance buying habits because of genetic risk.
PROF. CARLE: I also think that it’s really important as we engage
in this conversation about insurance and we’ve spent a lot of time on
insurance to know that most people get their health insurance
through their job, through their work, so there is a tremendous link,
or spillover in relationship, between some of these insurance issues
and somebody’s ability to either stay employed or to gain
employment, because in our country that’s where people for the most
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part get their insurance. So, while these issues are important in the
insurance context, they also have an important impact in terms of
employment.
PROF. RASKIN: No one has really talked about the privacy value
just in—I mean, is there kind of a personal autonomy where privacy
value and just not having to show this information or not give it up,
even if it has some predictability?
MR. MILLER: Or not wanting to know, and I think that’s really
very, very important. In my family we have a very strong history of
cancer, and there are tests out there that I can do that will tell me
whether I have the “cancer gene” that other people in my family
have. But there is no medical therapy available to fix the “cancer
gene” or prevent cancer from occurring. There is nothing that I can
do differently in my life as a result of knowing whether I have the
cancer gene or not, and, quite frankly, I don’t want to know that
because if I do have that gene I don’t want to be walking around
knowing that I’m a ticking time bomb that maybe tomorrow, maybe
this little bump is cancer. That is not the way I want to live. Other
people may in fact want to know that information, but it’s ultimately
my choice, and I think that it’s inappropriate for an insurance
company, or an employer for that matter, to insist in order to be
insured or in order to gain employment that I have to know
information that I don’t want to know. I think privacy includes the
right not to know.
MS. SANDZA: A corollary to that is the AIDS testing for life
insurance policies. In several states, while they allow the insurance
companies to test for AIDS, which was not a predictive test but it was
a current test, they did not require them—the insured himself didn’t
need to know, didn’t have to know—the applicant. So, there was
some precedent for that.
PROF. CARLE: I think the privacy issue is very important because
in the private sector, if you don’t live in a state that has in their state
constitution a privacy right that extends to the private sector, really
there is no privacy protection generally and, again, I think this is one
of the intuitions that we can get at through genetic testing because it
is so new and we are sort of squeamish about it—to suggest that
employees really do have rights to privacy in all kinds of ways that we
should recognize, not just through information that can be gained
through genetic testing but other information, too, that’s not
relevant to the employer’s ability to make decisions about their job
performance.
MR. BAILEY: I think we’re going to have to wrap up officially.
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PROF. RASKIN: Okay, it’s over. Thank you for your hard work
today.
(Whereupon, at 3:22 p.m., the PROCEEDINGS were adjourned.)
* * * * *
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